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Firm productivity is low in African countries, prompting 
governments to try a number of active policies to 
improve it. Yet despite the millions of dollars spent on 
these policies, we are far from a situation where we know 
whether many of them are yielding the desired payoffs. 
This paper establishes some basic facts about the number 
and heterogeneity of firms in different sub-Saharan 
African countries and discusses their implications for 
experimental and structural approaches towards trying 
to estimate firm policy impacts. It shows that the 
typical firm program such as a matching grant scheme 
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or business training program involves only 100 to 300 
firms, which are often very heterogeneous in terms 
of employment and sales levels. As a result, standard 
experimental designs will lack any power to detect 
reasonable sized treatment impacts, while structural 
models which assume common production technologies 
and few missing markets will be ill-suited to capture 
the key constraints firms face. Nevertheless, the author 
suggests a way forward which involves focusing on a 
more homogeneous sub-sample of firms and collecting a 
lot more data on them than is typically collected.  
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1.  Introduction 
The last decade was a good one for growth in many African countries, as a reduction in conflict, 
improved political and macroeconomic stability, booming commodity prices, and a number of 
microeconomic reforms led to a growth surge (Radelet, 2010). The McKinsey Global Institute 
(2010) calculates that labor productivity grew annually at 2.7 percent in Africa during the 2000s, 
compared  to  negative  labor  productivity  growth  in  the  1980s  and  1990s.    Yet  despite  this 
reversal, productivity remains low in many firms. Van Dijk (2003) finds that labor productivity 
in South Africa, the most advanced economy in sub-Saharan Africa, was only 20 percent of U.S. 
levels in 1999. Likewise, Harrison et al. (2010) find labor productivity in sub-Saharan African 
countries during the mid-2000s to be 36 percent lower than performance in the top half of the set 
of  non-African  countries  with  income  levels  below  $3000  in  PPP  terms.  Increasing  this 
productivity is vital for long-run growth prospects and generating the jobs needed to employ 
Africa’s young and rapidly growing labor force. 
Private sector development policy agendas of most governments in the region pursue two 
interrelated approaches to spurring private sector growth and increasing firm productivity. The 
first  is  to  provide  a  better  enabling-environment  for  businesses  through  maintaining 
macroeconomic  stability,  reducing  administrative  and  regulatory  barriers,  and  investing  in 
infrastructure. The second, and more activist, policy approach is to enact programs which work 
directly  with  micro,  small,  medium  and  large  firms  to  enhance  their  growth  and  create 
employment. Examples of these programs include matching grants, business trainings, partial 
credit guarantees, and wage subsidies. Despite, the millions of dollars invested in such programs, 
to date there is little rigorous evidence as to their effectiveness. The purpose of this paper is to 
discuss  the  challenges  and  potential  for  experimental  and  structural  methods  to  help 
policymakers in understanding whether or not these policies are working and why. 
Recently there has been considerable debate in the broader development literature about 
whether the profession is overemphasizing randomization (Rodrik 2009; Deaton 2010; Ravallion 
2009; Imbens 2010). I agree with Imbens that, given the question which one is interested in 
answering is possible to answer with randomization, there is little to gain and much to lose by 
not randomizing. I also agree that there are many important policy questions we wish to answer 
that it may not be possible to randomize for, and that economics still has something to offer in 3 
 
answering those questions. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that when it comes to rigorous 
evaluation of private sector policies in Africa, there has not been much in the way of either 
experimental or structural work – so there is plenty of scope for both types going forward – and 
hopefully this paper will help researchers considering either approach. 
I begin section 2 by establishing a number of facts about the private sector and the firms 
participating in private sector programs in different African countries.  Most importantly, the 
number of medium and large firms is relatively small in most countries, as are the number of 
firms  participating  in  any  given  firm-level  intervention.  Moreover,  these  firms  are  quite 
heterogeneous in terms of employment size, industry, and sales levels. Section 3 examines the 
implications of these facts for the power of experiments to detect impacts of firm policies, and 
for the ability of structural models to credibly estimate firm behaviors. The number of firms and 
heterogeneity of these firms poses challenges for both approaches. In section 4, I then discuss a 
way forward, which involves focusing attention on a smaller, more homogeneous sample of 
firms and collecting a lot more data on these firms. Section 5 then concludes. 
2.  Background on Small, Medium and Large Enterprises in Africa 
Before discussing which methods of evaluation and estimation are likely to be most appropriate 
for assessing policies directed at firms in Africa, it is useful to establish some facts about the 
likely populations of interest for such studies.  
2.1  Fact 1: The number of SMEs and large firms in many African countries is relatively 
small. 
I begin by first asking how many firms there are of different sizes, as collected through industrial 
censuses in selected countries. These censuses differ somewhat in their coverage: some only 
cover  manufacturing  and  some  exhibit  an  incomplete  coverage  of  home-based  enterprises. 
Nevertheless, they give a sense of the scale of small, medium, and large scale enterprise activity.  
Table 1 shows that there are many firms with fewer than 10 workers in most African 
countries, and there are more of such firms in wholesale and retail trade than in manufacturing. 
Within the category of firms with fewer than 10 workers, the vast majority have at most one or 
two workers. For example, in Mauritius, out of the 91,980 units with 9 or fewer workers, 70.6 4 
 
percent have only one or two workers, and only 6.2 percent have five to nine workers.
1 Likewise, 
among manufacturing firms in Tanzania, only 8.9 percent of firms with less than 10 workers 
have 5 to 9 workers, whereas 60.8 percent have 1 or 2 workers. Based on Table 1, these numbers 
imply populations of around 770 to 2150 manufacturing firms with 5 to 9 workers. This is about 
the same size as the number of manufacturing firms with 10 or more workers, which is in the 
1000 to 2000 firm range for most cou ntries in the table.  Once one starts getting towards large 
firms, with 100 or more workers, the population sizes in most African countries get quite small – 
there are 80 of such firms in Tanzania, 114 in Uganda, and 251 in Ghana according to this data. 
Some policies are targeted just at exporting firms. Mauritius is the only one of the countries in 
Table 1 for which data on the number of export-oriented firms is available, reporting 386 such 
firms in 2010.
2 
Second, note that there is considerable heterog eneity in what firms produce within the 
broad category of manufacturing. For example, of the 2,203 Ethiopian manufacturing firms with 
10  or  more  employees,  562  were  involved  in   the  manufacture  of food  products  (itself  a 
heterogeneous category), 127 in paper and paper products, 363 in furniture, 47 in textiles, 87 in 
rubber and rubber products, 75 in chemical and chemical products, and the remainder in a variety 
of other products.  As a consequence, the number of medium and large firms in most African 
countries in any given manufacturing sector is likely to be relatively small. 
2.2  Fact 2: There is considerable heterogeneity in firm performance among these firms. 
There  is  also  tremendous  heterogeneity  in  firm  outcomes.  Table  2  uses  the  World  Bank 
Enterprise Surveys to illustrate the variation among firms in three key outcomes that policy 
interventions often try to affect: employment, firm sales, and whether or not firms export. I break 
the data down into three size categories: fewer than 10 workers, 10-100 workers, and more than 
100 workers.
3 Few of the Enterprise Surveys contain data on firms with less than 5 workers, so 
the first size category should be considered as encompassing small firms with 5 to 9 worker s. 
                                                           
1 http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/cso/ei717/toc.htm 
2 http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/cso/ei869/toc.htm. Export-oriented firms are those with an export processing zone 
certificate and those manufacturing goods for export. 
3 All numbers reported are for the unweighted data, to illustrate the variation among the sample of firms.  This 
illustrates the variation in the actual data one might have in using the data that is currently regularly collected on 
African firms; using the survey weights also gives large heterogeneity. 5 
 
First, consider employment. We see that for firms with 5 to 9 workers, the standard deviation of 
employment is about one-third of the mean. This coefficient of variation (the standard deviation 
divided by the mean), increases to 0.72 on average for firms with 10 to 100 workers and 1.25 on 
average for firms with more than 100 workers. The heterogeneity is much larger with regard to 
revenues – on average the cross-sectional standard deviation is 3.1 times the mean for firms with 
5-9 workers, and 4.2 times the mean for firms with 10 to 100 workers. The potential for a large 
outlier to increase this dramatically is seen in a couple of cases where the coefficient of variation 
exceeds 10. Finally, only a minority of firms export, with quite a lot of variation across countries 
in this percentage. 
2.3  Firms participating in SME projects are typically also relatively small in number 
and very heterogeneous. 
Last, it is useful to get a sense of the number of firms actually involved in major policy efforts to 
actively benefit firms in Africa, and what these policy efforts are. A typical World Bank loan to 
enhance private sector competitiveness in Africa has two main elements: a component desired to 
improve the business climate and reduce regulatory burden and a component which actively tries 
to enhance the productivity of firms through policies which work at the firm level. One of the 
most common forms of actively helping firms is through matching grant programs, whereby the 
government  reimburses  firms  for  50  percent  of  the  cost  of  business  services  like  hiring  a 
consultant, launching a marketing campaign, training workers, or attending a trade fair. The 
typical justification for such subsidies is a belief that firms underinvest in these services because 
of externalities to other firms: for example, firms might hesitate to train workers if there is a 
chance that the workers will then leave and start their own firms or go to work for competitors.  
A few of these programs focus solely on the export sector, with the aim of getting firms to 
diversify into other markets or other products, but most of these matching grant programs are 
open to a wide variety of sectors. 
Table 3 uses data from World Bank project completion reports to highlight the number of 
firms participating in these projects. A typical project seems to involve giving out matching 
grants totaling $1-5 million to between 100 and 500 firms, and has a duration of around 5 years. 
Projects focusing on exports have fewer firms: with a range of 13 to 149 firms seen in the data. 
Within some of these programs there can be considerable heterogeneity in both the size of the 6 
 
intervention, and in the types of firms receiving them. For example, the Zambia matching grant 
program gave out 63 grants, of which 23 were for less than $5000, 33 between $5,000 and 
$50,000, and 7 above $50,000; 39 percent of the firms were in manufacturing, 30 percent in 
services, 14 percent in agriculture, 6 percent in tourism, and the rest in other sectors.
4 In other 
programs  the  range  of  the  grants  offered  can  be  smaller,  but  there  is  usually  still  large 
heterogeneity in the sectors. For example, the matching grants under the South Africa Bl ack 
Business Supplier development project were capped at US$17,000, and restricted to firms with 
fewer than 20 employees. Even given these restrictions which make the firms more homogenous, 
a survey of 50 participating enterprises showed full -time employment with a mean o f 9.9, 
standard deviation of 8.0, and 2004 revenues with a mean of 983,000 rand and standard deviation 
of 2,726,000 rand: that is, like the enterprise survey data, the standard deviation of sales is 
several times its mean. The Kenya project listed in Table 3 is notable as an exception, and an 
illustration that projects focused on microenterprises may serve many more firms than those 
focusing on SMEs.  
Table 4 summarizes a half-dozen projects on SMEs being undertaken by the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) in Africa. These projects are typically directed at firms in a particular 
sector, such as firms in, or linked to, the mining industry. As a result, the firms in these projects 
appear to be typically smaller in number, but more homogeneous, than those in the World Bank 
projects. In addition, the IFC offers business training through its  Business Edge program
5 in a 
number  of  African  countries.  Table 4  shows  that  numbers  of  firms participating   in  these 
programs in the last year are small in most countries (e.g. 16 in South Africa, 19 in Senegal), but 
in a couple of countries get up to a size of around 300-400 (Nigeria and Kenya). 
Numbers are also often small for other organizations working to generate firm growth in 
African countries. Technoserve is one of the better known NGOs, which runs business plan 
competitions in different countries. In 2006 and 2007 they trained 120 people in Ghana, with 11 
businesses launched; in Kenya in 2007 and 2008 t hey had 38 businesses launched, and in 
Swaziland between 2006 and 2009 they had 87 businesses launched.  
                                                           
4 Source: World Bank Implementation Completion Report. 
5 http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/africa.nsf/Content/SMED_BusinessEdge. In many of these training sessions there are 
several individuals per firm being trained, so the total number of people trained exceeds the number of firms trained. 
But for the purpose of assessing firm outcomes, the number of firms trained is the more relevant metric. 7 
 
Finally, it is worth keeping in mind that none of these projects has been subject to a 
rigorous experimental evaluation or to a rigorous structural evaluation to date. Although a couple 
of  experimental  evaluations  are  in  the  early  stages  for  matching  grant  projects,  this  lack  of 
evaluation to date is consistent with the general lack of rigorous evaluation of SME projects in 
most  areas  of  the  World  (McKenzie,  2010),  and  is  indicative  of  the  practical  and  political 
challenges one will face in doing evaluations. This is especially the case in experimental studies 
where the thought of randomly deciding which firms get a program is often anathema to self-
professed experts who believe that they know how to decide which firms would most benefit 
from a program (despite any evidence to support this I would argue), and to politicians who 
sometimes view the benefits of such programs as rents to be dished out to favored firms. Thus 
whilst  the remainder of the paper concentrates  on what  is  technically feasible to  do, it also 
requires considerable effort, skill, and luck on the part of researchers to make it also politically 
feasible.  
3.  Implications of these Facts for Evaluation of SME Policies 
These  facts  pose  several  large  challenges  for  both  experimental  and  structural  modeling 
approaches to determining whether development interventions involving firms meet their goals. 
Typical goals of these projects are to increase firm sales and/or employment. For example, the 
2009 Mauritius Manufacturing and Services Development and Competitiveness Project has a 
goal of a 20 percent increase in sales over three years from its matching grant program; and the 
2005 Tanzania Private Sector Competitiveness Project has a goal of a 10 percent increase in 
sales after two years, and 15 percent increase in sales after five years for firms supported by the 
project. 
3.1  Implications and Challenges for Experimental Design 
The first challenge any experimental evaluation also faces is convincing policymakers of the 
need for an experiment. Given the relatively large amounts of money being spent on these SME 
programs (Table 2), the lack of existing rigorous evidence for the impact of such programs 
(McKenzie, 2010), and the potential for such programs to be seen as merely subsidizing wealthy 
firms with little benefits for the remainder of the population, there is certainly a strong case to be 
made for experimentation and testing whether the programs work. The toolkit of Duflo et al. 8 
 
(2008) discusses a number of strategies for implementing an experiment, and along with their 
advantages and disadvantages. Four such strategies are over-subscription, randomized phase-in, 
randomization  among  marginal  applicants  (see  also  Karlan  and  Zinman,  2010),  and 
encouragement designs.  
The best case scenario is to be able to implement an over-subscription design. In such a 
case, there is excess demand for the program beyond what project resources can support.  Then a 
fair and equitable way of allocating the program’s scarce resources can be through randomly 
choosing which firms will participate in the program. Based on Table 1, an over-subscription 
design  will  be  a  lot  easier  to  implement  for  projects  focusing  on  microenterprises  or  small 
enterprises than SMEs because there are simply many more micro and small enterprises. In fact, 
some SME projects have struggled to disburse all available funding and achieve their target 
number  of  participating  firms.  In  the  Zambia  project  listed  in  Table  3,  only  45  percent  of 
available funding for the matching grant program was disbursed. The project review concluded 
that this was in part due to a lack of corporate depth in Zambia, with an insufficient number of 
companies to meet targeted project numbers.  
A randomized phase-in design can help in this situation. Under such a design, some firms 
are randomly selected to receive the project first, while others remain eligible to receive it in 
later periods. Oftentimes, projects lack the capacity to serve everyone at the same time. From an 
operational standpoint, this approach then allows the project to learn as it goes and does not 
require turning down interested firms. The downside of the phase-in design is that its potential to 
reveal a program’s impact is limited to the short-term: the time until other firms are brought into 
the program. Furthermore, if firms know for sure that they will get the project in the future, then 
firms might change their current behavior. In order to avoid creating expectations and changing 
behavior, it is preferable to tell firms they can re-apply for future rounds, rather than guarantee 
that they will get the program in the future. 
Randomization  among  marginal  applicants  involves  program  implementers  selecting 
firms that they identify as top priorities (e.g. perhaps the most likely to grow firms, firms in 
specific target groups or the best credit risks), rejecting firms deemed well below the eligibility 
bar,  and  then  randomly  select  which  of  the  remaining  firms  can  participate.  Given  the 9 
 
tremendous uncertainty which surrounds efforts to ex ante determine credit risk or firms’ growth 
prospects,  it  is  realistic  to  think  that  a  large  fraction  of  firms  applying  for  loans,  credit 
guarantees, or matching grant schemes may fall into this “marginal” category. In this case, the 
treatment parameter will be the effect of the program on marginal candidates, which, although it 
doesn’t tell policymakers the overall impact of their program, is useful for deciding whether to 
expand access to more or less firms. 
Under an encouragement design, the program is open to all firms, but some firms are 
randomly  chosen  to  be  “encouraged”  to  participate,  perhaps  through  targeted  visits  and 
marketing or hand-holding efforts to help firms apply for the program. Such designs typically 
require a large number of eligible firms and very effective encouragement strategies for success. 
This is likely to be difficult to achieve given the firm populations in many African countries and 
the lack of proven ways to dramatically increase program participation. 
An  additional  implication  of  Table  3  is  that  with  an  average  duration  of  5  years, 
evaluation of these types of firm programs by means of randomized experiments will take years 
to show results. Note however, that this does not mean that research will only be able to show 
impacts 5 years later – ideally results from experimentally implementing the project in the first 
year or two of the project can guide how the project is implemented in the remaining years.  
3.2  Implications and Challenges for Experimental Power 
The power of a statistical test is the probability that it will reject a null hypothesis given that the 
null hypothesis is false. A starting point in most experiments is to test the null hypothesis that the 
intervention had no effect, so the power of the experiment is a measure of the ability to detect an 
effect of a given policy intervention if such an effect does exist. Suppose an oversubscription 
design  has  been  implemented.  Then,  the  small  number  of  firms  in  many  programs  and  the 
tremendous heterogeneity amongst them will still pose a severe power challenge for randomized 
experiments. To illustrate this, Table 5 presents power calculations for a hypothetical experiment 
on firms exhibiting the same degree of heterogeneity as witnessed in the data in Table 2. To take 
a best case scenario, we assume 100 percent compliance with treatment allocation, so that all 
firms randomly assigned to participate in a program actually do participate, and none of the 
control firms participate. In practice for many programs, especially those which involve a cost to 10 
 
the firm for participating, compliance may be lower. For example, in an experiment to evaluate 
the  effect  of  financial  literacy  training  on  female  entrepreneurs  in  Uganda,  only  half  of  the 
treatment group invited to participate in the training actually attended (McKenzie and Weber, 
2009).  Other  recent  business  training  experiments  have  found  higher  attendance  rates  when 
given to members of microfinance groups (e.g. Berge et al. (2010) report 83% of the women in 
their  business  training  experiment  in  Tanzania  attended  often  enough  to  get  the  completion 
certificate), but 100 percent compliance is unlikely. 
Table 5 reports the power of an experiment with 300 treatment and 300 control firms to 
detect the types of treatment effects often targeted as results of projects like those in Tables 3 and 
4.
6 It also reports the size of the treatment group one would need in order to achieve 90 percent 
power, assuming an equal-sized control group. The results in the first column show that if a one-
off follow-up survey is conducted of treatment and control firms, the sample sizes nee ded to 
detect program effects of interest are larger than the number of firms participating in typical 
SME programs, and indeed larger than the total number of manufacturing firms with 10 or more 
employees that exist in some African countries. For example, with treatment and control groups 
of 300 firms each, the power is only 12.9 percent for being able to detect a 20 percent increase in 
sales, 41.7 percent for detecting a 10 percent increase in employment, and 36.8 percent to detect 
a 5 percentage point increase in the proportion of firms exporting (from an assumed baseline rate 
of 12% of firms exporting). 
The next three columns consider the improvement in power from also using baseline 
data, under a variety of assumptions about the autocorrelation in firm  outcomes (ρ). Firm data 
exhibit considerable variability, much of it seemingly genuine (Fafchamps et al. 2010a), and 
available data suggest that the autocorrelation of profits or sales over periods of 6 months to 1 
year is likely to be 0.5 or less (McKenzie, 2011). As a result, adding baseline data improves 
power slightly, but not dramatically – with ρ = 0.5, we would still need treatment and control 
groups each of 3547 to detect a 20 percent increase in sales with 90 percent power.  
Carrying  out  multiple  rounds  of  post-treatment  follow-up  surveys  and  pooling  these 
multiple  measures  can  be  used  to  further  increase  power  (McKenzie,  2011).  For  example, 
                                                           
6 Specifically, I assume mean sales of 1000 with a standard deviation of 3000, mean employment of 29 with a 
standard deviation of 21, and that 12% of firms in the control group export. 11 
 
Fafchamps et al. (2010b) use two pre-treatment and four post-treatment rounds of data collection 
in an experiment designed to alleviate capital constraints in Ghanaian microenterprises. This 
approach  offers  some  hope  for  achieving  adequate  power  levels  to  detect  increases  in 
employment or exporting with treatment and control groups of each 300 to 400 firms, but will 
still not yield enough power to detect a 20 percent increase in sales.  
The  bottom  line  therefore  from  this  analysis  is  that  many  SME  projects,  even  if 
experimentally implemented with 100 percent compliance, are unlikely to be able to tell whether 
they  achieved  their  desired  outcomes  given  the  number  and  heterogeneity  of  the  firms 
participating. Next, I discuss my thoughts on the ability of structural methods to resolve this 
problem, before returning to ask what we can identify with firm experiments. 
3.3  Implications and Challenges for Structural Methods 
I should acknowledge here that I am at most a consumer, rather than producer, of research on 
firms using structural models.  With this in mind, let me discuss what I see of three important 
challenges that structural modeling is likely to face given the nature of firms and projects aiming 
to assist firms in many African countries. 
The first challenge is that structural modeling of firm production and productivity is more 
convincing when homogeneous firms can be reasonably assumed to be using the same common 
production technology, leading to a focus of many industrial organization papers on very specific 
industries such as ready-mix concrete, ready-to-eat cereals, minivans, etc. Nevertheless, when it 
comes to productivity estimation, such narrow focus is the exception, and it is more typical for 
studies to group together firms at the 2-digit ISIC industry level (e.g. textiles and apparel, or food 
products).  This  is  done  for  sample  size  reasons  rather  than  any  theoretical  or  empirical 
justification that the same production function should apply for all such firms. The reality of 
many interventions directed at firms in Africa is instead one of a wide mix of heterogeneous 
firms operating in many different sectors, for which assuming a common production technology 
is highly inappropriate. Assuming that this problem can be solved by the inclusion of sector 
dummies also appears wishful thinking. Alternatively, one could focus on specific industries, but 
the small number of firms in many industries in most African countries makes this more difficult 
to do than in larger developed country markets. 12 
 
The second key challenge to structural modeling approaches to assessing whether firm 
policies  are  working  in  African  countries  is  the  pervasive  market  failures  and  potential 
externalities that these same policies are intended to overcome. Consider for example, attempting 
to  use  a  structural  approach  to  estimate  the  increase  in  production  and  employment  from  a 
matching  grant  program.
7  Such a grant could induce additional investment by overcoming 
liquidity constraints, subsidizing firms for taking on uninsured risk, act as a spur to force 
entrepreneurs to avoid procrastination, change the decision -making process of firm owners by 
getting them to consider inputs (like consultants) that they had never considered before or had 
information about before, etc. The parameters in any structural model which has been estimated 
without taking into account these potential missing markets are unlikely to be informative about 
the effects of overcoming them. But standard approaches to production function estimation (e.g. 
Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) do not account for such constraints. While structural models have 
been developed to incorporate liquidity constraints (Schündeln, 2010), such models rely heavily 
on functional form and distributional assumptions and are complex to solve  – adding the full 
range of potential market failures facing these firms to such models would likely be extremely 
difficult to solve and even more reliant on additional questionable assumptions. 
Note,  however,  that  since  we  never  directly  observe  productivity,  some  approach  to 
productivity  estimation  is  needed  if  productivity  is  the  outcome  of  interest,  even  in  an 
experimental impact evaluation. I have only seen experiments look at labor productivity (defined 
in terms of the observed quantities sales/employment) as an outcome, but if one wished to get the 
experimental impact on total factor productivity, then these structural approaches to productivity 
estimation would typically be needed (unless one conducts an experiment that independently 
shocks each input to the production function).  
I  am  very sympathetic  to  the idea that,  given the large  cost  and long  time frame of 
existing  SME  interventions,  it  is  desirable  to  learn  what  we  can  about  the  impact  of  these 
existing projects via ex post evaluation. But the third challenge facing both structural estimation 
and ex post non-experimental impact evaluations is the general lack of panel data on firms in 
most African countries. Both structural estimation and non-experimental impact evaluations are 
                                                           
7 Note, I am not aware of any paper which has actually tried to do this, but I use this to illustrate the difficulty a 
purely structural approach would have in answering this policy question of interest. 13 
 
more convincing if there are many periods of pre-intervention data on which to either estimate 
structural parameters or from which to create non-experimental control groups, coupled with 
detailed data on firm participation in different programs, and several rounds of post-intervention 
data.
8 I do not know of a single African country for which such data are readily available. 
4.  A Way Forward? 
So, where does this leave us? Is there scope for actually learning what works in firm programs in 
Africa given these issues? I think so, provided we are a little more modest in our aims and a lot 
more data intensive. While my belief is  that there is  a lot we  can learn from  well targeted 
experiments, many of the recommendations here will also aid in making structural modeling and 
non-experimental estimation more believable as well.  
4.1  Focus on a Smaller Number of More Homogenous Firms 
Given that I have said that one of the problems facing firm studies in Africa is the small number 
of firms, it may seem a little counterintuitive to say we should reduce the number of firms 
studied. But lumping together a firm with 5000 workers with one with 101 workers, or one with 
$50,000 annual sales with one with $5 million annual sales loses more through the increase in 
heterogeneity than it gains through the benefit in sample size. The key problem facing the power 
calculations in Table 5 is the large coefficient of variation. Restricting our set of attention to a set 
of more homogenous firms will shrink this coefficient, thereby increasing our power to detect 
program  effects.  Restricting  ourselves  to  studying  more  homogeneous  firms  will  also  aid 
structural analysis by making it more reasonable to assume a common production function. 
A first approach to doing this is just to screen firms based on baseline size, and focus any 
evaluation on identifying the average treatment effect of the intervention for a more homogenous 
subgroup of the overall pool of firms participating in the program. While we might not be able to 
say whether an export facilitation program works for all firms, separating out the few largest 
firms that dwarf the rest of the sample before randomizing the rest into treatment and control 
                                                           
8  See  for  example  the  rich  data  used  by  Kaboski  and  Townsend  (forthcoming)  in  a  structural  evaluation  of  a 
microfinance program in Thailand. They also use quasi-experimental variation in helping to identify their structural 
model, illustrating the potential of these methods to work together. 14 
 
may allow us to cleanly identify treatment effects for the majority of interested firms.
9 One can 
go further and restrict attention to a smaller number of firms from a specific industry, as Bloom 
et al. (2011) do for textile firms in India. Homogenous firms operating in the same industry a re 
likely to face many of the same seasonal effects and industry -level shocks, which can then be 
differenced out of the data, making it easier to distinguish the impact of an intervention from all 
these other factors that change firm outcomes from one peri od to the next. Such an approach is 
also helpful for structural modeling, since the production function and the nature of potential 
market failures facing the industry can likely be better understood and modeled than is the case 
with a mix of firms from different industries. 
Table  6  illustrates  using  the  World  Bank  Enterprise  Surveys  the  reduction  in  the 
coefficient of variation (C.V.) of sales that one obtains by focusing on different sets of more 
homogeneous firms. I take the set of surveys where there ar e at least 200 firms with 10 to 100 
workers, and then examine the C.V.  for all firms in this group, then for the firms in specific 
industries, for the firms with sales below a certain threshold, and for firms with 10 to 30 workers. 
We see that focusing on a specific industry often, but not always, reduces the C.V. For example, 
in Ghana, the C.V. reduces from 3.0 for all firms to 1.2 for garment firms and 2.5 for firms in the 
food sector. However, in South Africa, the C.V. actually increases from 1.9 for al l firms to 2.0 
for garment firms and 2.1 for food firms, with the industry-level samples only about 12 percent 
of the size of the full sample. Focusing on more homogeneous firms in terms of employee size 
likewise has a general tendency to reduce the C.V.,  but some cases with small increases. The 
strategy that is most successful in reducing the C.V. of sales is to concentrate on firms with sales 
below a certain range (here $100,000 annual sales). This reduces the C.V. below one in all 
country cases. However, note that if sales are not strongly autocorrelated, then the C.V. of future 
sales may be larger than that of baseline sales in this group. 
Reducing the C.V.  can make an enormous difference to the sample size required to 
achieve adequate power. For example, to detect the 20 percent increase in sales with ρ = 0.5 and 
a single baseline and follow-up, Table 3 shows a treatment group size of 3547 firms is required. 
Reducing the coefficient of variation from 3 to 2 reduces the required treatment group size to 
                                                           
9 One can also increase power further within this subgroup by stratified or matched pair randomization designs (see 
Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009). 15 
 
1577 firms, and reducing it to 1 (mean = standard deviation) reduces it to 395 firms. Based on 
this and experiences in other countries, my recommendation is therefore to aim for an initial pool 
of firms whose standard deviation of sales is no greater than their mean. However, as we have 
seen, the number of firms in any particular industry in most African countries can be quite small, 
so we are unlikely to get treatment and control groups of 300 firms each using such an approach. 
This brings me to the second step needed: 
4.2  Collect a Lot More Data on These Firms 
The typical SME project collects very little data on the firms in the project, and often none on 
comparable firms not participating in the project. Even in cases where experiments are being 
planned, the default option is often to conduct a baseline survey, a midline survey (at say 1 year) 
in some cases, and then an endline survey. While such an approach is often appropriate for 
educational and health interventions in which outcomes like anthropometrics and test scores are 
highly persistent, but it is less well-suited to learning about dynamic firms, whose sales and 
profits  can  differ  dramatically  from  one  month  to  another  due  to  seasonality,  idiosyncratic 
demand shocks, shocks to the supply of labor, and a host of other reasons.  
In  McKenzie  (2011),  I  provide  theory  and  evidence  to  show  the  increases  in  power 
possible from collecting more waves of data than the usual baseline and follow-up. There are two 
important  uses  for  more  frequently  collected  data.  The  first,  and  better  known,  is  for 
understanding the trajectory of program impacts, and for helping to unpack causal chains. For 
example, if we want to know whether an effort to formalize firms increases firm growth by 
allowing firms better access to formal credit, having multiple data points allows measurement of 
whether  changes  in  credit  precede  firm  growth  or  instead  follow  it.  The  second,  and  less 
practiced, use of more frequent data is to collect multiple measurements on noisy and weakly 
autocorrelated outcomes. For example, in a microenterprise survey, measuring several months of 
profits allows noise in a given month to be averaged out, increasing the power to detect genuine 
effects of a program. 
With  larger  firms  it  may  be  possible  to  collect  even  more  frequent  data  on  key 
performance indicators like daily production, electricity usage, quality defects, and sales. Such 
data can then be used  for both  purposes  above  –  averaging out  daily  fluctuations,  and  also 16 
 
providing  detail  on  the  trajectory  of  an  effect.  Such  data  are  also  incredibly  valuable  for 
structural modeling, and for constructing comparable control groups in non-experimental impact 
evaluations. Moreover, with a large number of time periods on a smaller number of firms, one 
can move from standard estimators that rely on large-N asymptotics to estimators that rely on 
large-T. Bloom et al. (2011) provide an example of this, using over 100 observations per firm 
and the Ibramigov and Muller (2010) method to implement a t-statistic based estimator that is 
robust to substantial heterogeneity across firms as well as to considerable autocorrelation across 
observations within a firm.  
4.3  Recognize What Experiments Can and Cannot Do 
Employing the two recommendations offers the potential to estimate the average treatment effect 
of a firm policy for the types of firms that one has restricted the analysis to. Thus if we reduce 
the C.V. to a manageable level by focusing on firms with 10 to 100 workers and baseline sales 
below $100,000, this is the group for which we are able to estimate the policy impact. If there are 
only  a  couple  of  firms  in  the  whole  country  with  much  larger  sales  and  employment,  an 
experiment is not going to be able to reveal the impact of the policy on these two firms, and 
pooling these firms in with the remainder of the firm population will make it hard to detect the 
impact for any type of firm. Note that this is not a limitation of experiments alone – if there are 
really only two firms like this in the entire country with no firms comparable to them, then non-
experimental methods of impact evaluation are not going to be informative about these largest 
firms either. 
Then what can we say about the effects of a program on the largest firms? This is where I 
believe time series analysis and structural modeling can play their most important role provided 
that lots of data is collected on such firms. If we have daily production data on the same firm for 
a decent period of time pre-intervention, it is more credible to believe that we can approximate 
well its production function than is the typical case of only a couple of periods of data on many 
firms. Detailed data on a lot of different dimensions of firm behavior also allows for construction 
of  a  spatial  and  temporal  causal  chain,  and  testing  of  falsifiable  predictions  of  competing 
theories.  17 
 
5.  Conclusions 
African SMEs are small in number and heterogeneous in performance, which poses a challenge 
for both experimental and structural methods of estimating the impact of firm policies designed 
to facilitate employment creation and firm growth. In reviewing African data on firms and on the 
types of policies governments are using with these firms, it seems there are three sets of firm 
types, for which different evaluation methods may be suited. 
1.  The  vast  majority  of  firms  are  microenterprises.  Policies  which  focus  on  providing 
training,  credit,  or  other  assistance  for  these  firms  can  often  rely  on  standard 
randomization of a large number of firms to treatment and control groups, with a small 
number of surveys taken on each firm.  
2.  For SME projects and policies targeting smaller number of firms, one should attempt to 
reduce heterogeneity by focusing on a more homogeneous sub-sample within this target 
group – such as firms in particular industries or size categories – and then collect data in 
many survey rounds or time periods on these firms. Randomized experiments can be used 
to obtain policy impacts for this sub-sample, and the rich data gathered can provide a 
good basis for structural modeling. 
3.  For the largest firms there may be no other firms in the country that are comparable, 
making the use of experimental or non-experimental methods that require a comparison 
group for estimating the counterfactual not possible. In such cases, rich time series data 
on  multiple  dimensions  of  firm  behavior  and  firm  outcomes  can  enable  time  series 
analysis and structural modeling to get some sense of how the policy has performed. 
Finally, for years now there has been talk of how we can use experimental methods and 
structural modeling together to get the best of both worlds – using the experiment to identify 
structural  parameters  and  impacts  of  a  particular  policy,  and  then  the  structural  model  to 
undertake simulations of how firms would respond under alternative policies (e.g. Todd and 
Wolpin, forthcoming). At present this is more promise and rhetoric than reality when it comes to 
firm  experiments.  The  collection  of  much  more  data  and  the  use  of  randomization  in  the 
implementation  of  more  firm  policies  is  a  necessary  first  step  in  permitting  the  future 
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Table 1: Total Number of Firms in Selected African Countries
Botswana Ethiopia Ghana Mauritius Madagascar Tanzania Uganda
2005 2008/09 2003 2007 2005 2008 2006/07
Total number of manufacturing firms 1302 n.a. 26088 13639 19334 24979 n.a.
      With <10 employees 872
b n.a. 22181 12798
a 18030 24204 n.a.
      With 10 or more employees 430 2203 3907 841 1304 775 1024
      With 100+ employees 78 605 with 50+ 251 n.a. 190 with 200+ 80 114
Total number in trade 5817 n.a. n.a. n.a. 159594 122622 n.a.
      With <10 employees 5064
b n.a. n.a. 35132 157080 121589 n.a.
      With 10 or more employees 753 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2514 1033 n.a.
      With 100+ employees 26 n.a. n.a. n.a. 89 with 200+ 0 n.a.21 
 
 
Table 2: Heterogeneity in Firm Outcomes among African Firms
% of Firms
Survey Sample <10 employees 10-100 employees >100 employees Exporting
Country Year   Size Mean  S.D. Mean  S.D. Mean  S.D. C.V. C.V. C.V. 10+ workers
Ghana 2007 494 6.3 1.3 22.3 16.0 330 522 6.1 3.0 1.7 9.1
Kenya 2007 657 6.5 1.3 36.7 26.5 386 502 1.5 6.6 4.1 3.2
Mali 2007 490 6.2 1.1 23.0 16.5 215 80 2.7 2.3 1.1 5.9
Mozambique 2007 479 6.0 1.3 29.7 20.9 214 145 3.3 15.1 5.0 5.2
Nigeria 2007 1,891 6.5 1.3 24.1 18.4 188 125 9.6 2.6 1.8 9.2
Senegal 2007 506 6.3 1.3 22.9 19.9 429 623 1.7 1.9 1.8 10.3
SouthAfrica 2007 937 6.4 1.3 33.8 23.3 446 1005 1.5 1.9 2.6 22.6
Zambia 2007 484 6.3 1.4 33.9 24.7 275 324 2.2 1.4 1.4 11.6
Benin 2009 148 4.6 2.0 24.6 11.9 252 156 1.8 2.6 0.9 8.8
BurkinaFaso 2009 391 6.3 1.9 27.6 20.3 211 410 3.6 5.5 1.3 12.8
Cameroon 2009 363 6.1 1.6 29.2 19.6 424 804 1.8 5.3 1.8 2.2
CapeVerde 2009 152 6.1 1.8 33.5 22.3 225 150 2.9 6.3 4.1 11.2
Chad 2009 150 6.1 1.5 28.4 22.0 183 112 3.6 2.7 1.0 7.3
Congo 2009 139 5.1 2.6 31.4 21.6 327 209 3.5 2.0 1.3 7.9
Eritrea 2009 177 7.0 1.2 23.7 16.9 125 9 1.3 2.2 0.5 23.2
Gabon 2009 170 6.6 1.5 23.2 18.0 336 367 2.5 1.9 1.1 10.0
Ivory Coast 2009 526 4.6 2.2 25.0 18.8 425 1008 4.4 4.2 1.5 4.8
Lesotho 2009 146 5.6 1.8 29.5 20.7 3207 12688 2.9 2.1 1.9 21.2
Liberia 2009 150 6.0 1.5 24.1 17.4 193 72 6.1 6.2 1.2 28.7
Madagascar 2009 444 7.0 1.4 35.8 25.2 344 332 1.5 3.5 1.5 16.4
Malawi 2009 149 5.8 1.5 40.2 26.9 522 1038 1.0 1.8 1.7 12.8
Mauritius 2009 398 5.5 2.2 33.6 23.8 397 523 4.1 12.6 1.8 20.4
Niger 2009 150 6.2 1.6 28.9 21.1 211 210 2.4 3.7 1.4 14.0
Sierra Leone 2009 150 6.6 1.2 25.2 21.6 278 250 3.0 4.8 1.1 2.0
Togo 2009 154 5.7 1.6 28.5 21.1 254 157 2.5 2.0 1.0 19.5
Average 396 6.1 1.6 28.8 20.6 416 873 3.1 4.2 1.8 12.0
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys Harmonized Database
Sales




Table 3: Examples of World Bank Private Sector Projects involving Firms in Africa
Number of 
Country Project Name Year Type of Intervention US$ amount (000s) Beneficiary Firms
Cote d'Ivoire Private Sector Capacity Building Project 1999-2004 Matching Grant program for Exporters 2200 149 firms, 27 associations
Capacity building for SMEs  n.a. not implemented
South Africa Industrial Competitiveness and Job Creation Project 1998-2004 Matching Grant I: Competitiveness fund 17850 984 firms
Matching Grant II: Black-Business Suppliers 1870 672 firms
Matching grant fund for sub-sector partnerships 7620 96 partnerships
Zimbabwe Enterprise Development Project 1996-2002 Matching grants for associations n.a. 4
Matching grants for export firms 1000 13
SME finance facility n.a. 1079
Export finance facility 1500 28
Nigeria Second National Fadama Development Project 2004-2009 Matching grants for productive assets 15320 7,766
Mali  Private Sector Assistance 1992-2002 Matching grants 3300 468 firms, 303 associations
Niger Niger Agro-Pastoral Export Promotion Project 2001-2005 Matching grants for Exports 3950 64 associations, 20 enterprises
Mozambique Enterprise Development Project 2000-2006 Matching grants for firms 1860 328 firms
SME credit line 4335 52
Zambia Enterprise Development Project 1992-2003 Credit facility to SMEs 59830 192 firms
Matching grants 1100 63 firms
Mauritius Technical Assistance to Enhance Competitiveness Project 1994-99 Matching grants 5500 199 firms
Benin Private Sector Development Project 2000-07 Matching grants
Nigeria Private Small and Medium Enterprise Development Project 1989-1994 SME loans 132770 211 firms
Mozambique Small and Medium Scale Enterprise Development Project 1990-1997 SME credit line 28800 134 firms
Malawi Financial Sector and Enterprise Development Project 1992-98 SME credit line 25300 126 firms
Zimbabwe Small Scale Enterprise Project 1986-94 SME credit line 8500 246 firms
Ghana Private Small and Medium Enterprise Development Project 1989-1997 SME credit line 28200 109 firms
Equipment leasing 1400 25 firms
business training for entrepreneurs 587 individuals
Senegal Private Sector Capacity Building Project 1996-2001 Matching grants 2750 301 firms
Kenya Micro and Small Enterprise Training and Technology Project 1998-2002 Training for microenterprises 7500 34778 individuals





Table 4: Selected IFC SME Projects in Africa
Country Project Year Type of Intervention Number of Firms
Ghana Ahafo Linkages 2007- Managerial Mentoring 101
Guinea Guinea SME Linkages Project 2008- Capacity Building through Training 18
Mozambique Mozambique SME Initiative 2004-2010 Royalty Loans 18
Mozambique Mozlink 2006- Managerial and Technical Training 80 (planned)
South Africa Thandi Land Reform Project 2007- Package of finance, skills and equity 30 (planned)
Zambia Copperbelt Suppliers SME Development Program Capacity Building through Training 300
In-depth Advisory Services 36
Cameron Business Edge SME training courses 2010-11 Business training 125
Chad Business Edge SME training courses 2010-11 Business training 48
Ghana Business Edge SME training courses 2010-11 Business training 48
Kenya Business Edge SME training courses 2010-11 Business training 382
Madagascar Business Edge SME training courses 2010-11 Business training 115
Mozambique Business Edge SME training courses 2010-11 Business training 132
Nigeria Business Edge SME training courses 2010-11 Business training 320
Rwanda Business Edge SME training courses 2010-11 Business training 57
Senegal Business Edge SME training courses 2010-11 Business training 19
South Africa Business Edge SME training courses 2010-11 Business training 16
Source: http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/africa.nsf/Content/SMED_Programs and IFC Business Edge team.
Table 5: Power calculations for detecting impact of firm policies
Single
Follow-up ρ=0.3 ρ=0.5 ρ=0.7 2 follow-ups 3-follow-ups 4-follow-ups
10% increase in sales
  Power with 300 treated 0.069 0.071 0.076 0.088 0.089 0.097 0.102
  Treatment Sample size needed for 90% power 18914 17212 14186 9646 9457 7881 7093
20% increase in sales
  Power with 300 treated 0.129 0.137 0.156 0.208 0.211 0.244 0.266
  Treatment Sample size needed for 90% power 4729 4303 3547 2412 2365 1971 1774
50% increase in sales
  Power with 300 treated 0.532 0.571 0.654 0.815 0.823 0.885 0.915
  Treatment Sample size needed for 90% power 757 689 568 386 379 316 284
10% increase in employment for firm with 10-100 workers
  Power with 300 treated 0.417 0.450 0.524 0.688 0.697 0.774 0.815
  Treatment Sample size needed for 90% power 1030 938 773 526 515 430 387
5 percentage point increase in exporting
  Power with 300 treated 0.368 0.518 0.599 0.764 0.772 0.842 0.878
  Treatment Sample size needed for 90% power 1080 784 646 439 431 359 323
Notes: equal size treatment and control groups assumed




Table 6: Reducing the Coefficient of Variance for Sales by Focusing on more homogeneous firms
Country  Survey Year   Number of Firms C.V. Sales Number of Firms C.V. Sales Number of Firms C.V. Sales Number of Firms C.V. Sales Number of Firms C.V. Sales
Angola 2006 249 9.5 59 0.6 234 9.8 82 0.4
Tanzania 2006 207 3.7 47 4.1 137 2.7 86 0.7
Uganda 2006 323 4.5 59 3.3 255 3.2 172 0.7
Ghana 2007 211 3.0 54 1.2 44 2.5 177 3.4 135 0.6
Kenya 2007 356 6.6 39 2.2 68 2.6 201 9.3 51 0.5
Mozambique 2007 250 15.1 59 7.3 168 2.4 89 0.5
Nigeria 2007 925 2.6 75 1.2 226 1.8 744 2.7 397 0.5
SouthAfrica 2007 558 1.9 66 2.0 70 2.1 347 1.6
Zambia 2007 255 1.4 69 1.6 155 1.2 44 0.4
Madagascar 2009 239 3.5 141 5.5 64 0.6
Mauritius 2009 207 12.7 37 2.0 126 10.7 38 0.5
Average 343.6 5.9 58.5 1.7 73.8 2.8 244.1 4.8 115.8 0.5
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys Harmonized Database
Firms with Sales less than $100k
10-100 employees
 All Firms Firms in Garment Sector Firms in Food Sector All sectors
10-100 employees 10-100 employees 10-100 employees 10-30 employees